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IMPEACHMENT
"If any error was involved, it seems hardly prejudicial enough,
standing alone, to justify a new trial, at which the questions will
explicitly state the assumptions clearly implicit in the testimony at
the first trial."'56
Pending judicial exposition of the scope of Todd's effect on
the Penland rule, attorneys should follow the Todd formula of
introducing evidence and having it incorporated into a hypothetical
question designed to elicit carefully phrased opinions of their phy-
sician-witnesses. Caution is advised, for Todd's undermining of
Penland and its spiritual affinity with criticized evidence concepts57
may wipe out verdicts presumptively grounded on medical testimony
which, though uniformly acceptable outside of court, is not twisted
into phrases suitable for the strangely dissimilar ears of jurymen.
RICHARD W. ELLIS
Evidence-Traffic Violations to Impeach a Witness
Although counsel may coach his witness to "assume a virtue, if
you have it not,"' with the witness having a criminal record, it may
be of little avail. Courts have assumed that such a witness does not
have virtue and have not hesitated to allow questions about prior
criminal convictions for impeachment purposes,2 "to reduce or dis-
count the credibility of a witness for the purpose of inducing the
jury to give less weight to his testimony in arriving at the ultimate
facts in the case." 3
In the recent case of Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corporation,4
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was not error for
the trial judge to allow defense counsel on cross examination to
question plaintiff's witness concerning the following convictions:
speeding 65 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone, exceeding
a safe speed, drunken driving, operating a motor vehicle while his
Id. at 951.
See note 28 supra (hypothetical question); note 48 supra ("could" or
"might" rule).
I Shakespeare, Hamlet (III iv 160); see Bander, Shakespeare and the
Law, CASE & COMMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1968 at 47.
2 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 926 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WxGM!ORE].
State v Nelson, 200 N.C. 69, 72, 156 S.E. 154, 156 (1930).
' 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
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license was suspended, disregarding a stop signal, public drunken-
ness, and allowing an unlicensed minor to operate a motor vehicle.
This holding reaffirmed the North Carolina Court's position that
convictions of all crimes, be they felonies or misdemeanors, are ad-
missible for impeachment purposes.5 The reasoning behind this rule
and the criteria on which convictions are admitted or excluded should
be revaluated.
Underlying this rule of evidence is a syllogism similar to the fol-
lowing: all men convicted of a crime are bad men; all bad men are
untruthful; ergo, all men convicted of a crime are untruthful.0
The obvious fallacy in this theory is that it is an all inclusive gen-
eralization7 which ignores the problem of relevancy. With some men
and some crimes a conviction, especially if repeated, may be in-
dicative of the witness' lack of credibility," but such is not always
the case. A consideration of three general observations will illustrate
the danger of relying on such a fallacious theory to determine truth
at a trial.9 In the first place even a person convicted of a crime in-
volving dishonesty may have superior powers of observation and
memory, and in the absence of a reason to falsify, his testimony may
be worth more than that of a witness with a spotless reputation
whose powers of observation are limited and whose past experiences
'Accord, State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 593, 197 S.E. 176, 178 (1938).
D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 112 (2d ed. 1963). [herein-
after cited as STANSBURY].
' "It is not the specific tendency of the witness to falsify but the general
bad character of the witness as evidenced by the single act of which he was
convicted that creates the basis of admissibility." Ladd, Credibility Tests-
Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176 (1940). [hereinafter cited as
Ladd].
"The psychologist would probably find the major and minor premises of
the syllogism blatantly false, for as Wigmore indicates, "to the psychologist,
the common law's reliance on character as an index of falsehood is crude
and childish." WIGMOE § 922, at 447.
""While truth is truth whether it comes from a polluted or pure source
when facts are in dispute the source of the conflicting testimony may cast
light in determining what the truth is." Ladd 171.
' For an analysis of problems involved in determining truth in a jury
trial see Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining
Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 223 (1966). The weakness of
the rule permitting prior criminal convictions to reduce the credibility of
a witness is emphasized in those jurisdictions such as North Carolina where
the witness' answer is conclusive and the record may not be introduced.
While asking the question to make the jury disbelieve the testimony, if the
witness blatantly lies about his prior conviction, the jury never knows. See
State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944) ; Coleman v. Railroad, 138
N.C. 351, 50 S.E. 690 (1905); STANSBURY § 112, at 254.
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unconsciously influence his credibility."0 Secondly, there may be
people without criminal records who have no qualms about prevari-
cating even under oath." Finally, the nature of the crime rather
than the seriousness of the crime is important.' As one writer has
indicated, there may be some felonies, even murder and man-
slaughter, which have no bearing on a man's propensity to dishonesty
or falsification; while some misdemeanors, for example petty larceny,
may well be indicia of the credibility of the witness."8
From the nature of the crime, it is apparent that traffic violations
should not be admissible to impeach a witness because they have no
bearing on his credibility.' 4 Thus, the holding in Ingle illustrates
the problem of establishing a relationship between the prior con-
viction and the search for truth in a trial, and the necessity of mak-
ing relevancy the criterion. The immediate need in North Carolina,
" Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of a Witness,
52 CORNELL L. REv. 239, 241-42 (1967).
1 With many telling the truth is a habit and a principle which they
adhere to always though they may indulge in drinking, swearing,
gambling, roystering, or making close bargains. With others, lying is
the habit or principle, and if elevated to be senators, or made church
members or deacons, it does not always reform them. The object of
the law is to show the character of the witness as to telling the truth.
Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq. 150, 157 (Ch. 1869).
1 See 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law §§ 18-21 (1965) for a discussion of
the distinction between the terms felony and misdemeanor.1 Ladd 180.
" A number of courts have excluded evidence of traffic convictions to
impeach a witness. In New York the use of traffic violations is prohibited
by statute, and in Same v. Davison, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1937) the court said
that though a conviction arising out of the same occurrence was permissible
as prima facie evidence of the facts, on cross-examination of the defendant,
it should not have been permitted solely to affect credibility, accord, De
Stassio v. Jansen Dairy Corp., 279 N.Y. 501, 18 N.E. 2d 833 (1939); see
Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co. v. Richardson, 218 Ark. 427, 236 S.W.2d 713 (1951) ;
Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196 Md. 36, 75 A.2d 339 (1950);
Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927); State v. Hickman, 102
Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956); Contra, Monaghan v. Keith Oil
Co., 281 Mass. 129, 183 N.E. 252 (1932); Brown v. Howard, 42 R.I. 571,
114 A. 11 (1921). See also ANNOT., 20 A.L.R.2d 1217 (1951). It is in-
teresting to note that some courts refusing to admit evidence of traffic
violations have justified the exclusion on grounds of relevancy as in
Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co. where the judge said, "prior con-
victions for traffic violations of the motor vehicle law seem clearly to have
no direct bearing upon veracity. . . ." 196 Md. 36, 41, 75 A.2d 339, 341
(1950). In State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 333, 30 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1944),
Justice Seawell suggested that traffic violations not be used to impeach a
witness, and Stansbury later termed this a "wholesome suggestion." STANs-
BURY § 112, at 255.
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therefore, is to limit the felonies and misdemeanors 1 admissible to
those involving dishonesty and false statement. This formulation
is the one proposed by the Uniform Rules of Evidence 0 and has
been praised as possibly the best solution. 7
A look at the problem from the viewpoint of the jury and of the
witness will further illustrate the wisdom of making this change
in the rule. If a witness is a party to the action, it is doubtful that
the jury will ignore these convictions in deciding the verdict, espe-
cially if these prior convictions are of a similar nature. The jury
" Since the nature of the crime rather than the seriousness of the crime
should be emphasized, the use of all crimes, both felonies, and misdemeanors,
in North Carolina avoids the complications found in other jurisdictions
using a different formula to determine the types of criminal convictions
admissible. Either by legislation or judicial determination some courts allow
felonies and misdemeanors involving crinen falsi, for example forgery,
counterfeiting, and perjury, while other jurisdictions allow felonies and
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses
§ 507 nn. 70 & 69 (1957); 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 740 (1948). For
jurisdictions following the same rule as North Carolina see Bostic v. United
States, 94 F.2d 636 (D.D.C. 1937); Black v. State, 215 Ark. 618, 222
S.W.2d 816 (1949); McMullen v. Cannon, 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d
765 (1958); Quigley v. Turner, 150 Mass. 108, 55 N.E.2d 765 (1889);
Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267 (1954); State v. McKissic,
358 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962).
"Uniform Rule of Evidence § 21.
1 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 90 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CoRMIcK]. It should be noted here that there is another rule of evidence
relied upon in the principal case, i.e., proof of general character to impeach
a witness, which may hinder the North Carolina court in making this much
needed transition. Most courts permit only reputation for veracity to be
shown to impeach a witness and expressly refuse to allow proof of general
character. See Ladd 172. In Ingle, however, the first statement made by
the court was that "a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general
character is bad... ." 271 N.C. 276, 279, 156 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1967). Then,
quoting from State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938), the court
continued: "any act of the witness which tends to impeach his character
may be inquired about or proven by cross examination." 271 N.C. at 280,
156 S.E.2d at 269. Having made this determination, the court came rather
easily to its holding that all crimes including traffic violations are admissible
to impeach a witness's character by stating:
Nor do we think that a person who has been guilty of drunken driving
or consistently violates laws designed to protect life and property on
the highway can claim an unblemished general character.
Id. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270. (emphasis added). Thus, by using general
character, the court avoided the issue of the relevancy of the prior criminal
convictions to ascertain the witness's credibility. It should be noted, however,
that an inconsistency between the rule for proving character to impeach
and the rule for admitting prior criminal convictions exists even in juris-
dictions permitting only character for veracity to be shown to impeach a
witness. In these latter jurisdictions honesty and veracity do not seem to
be the criteria for admitting prior criminal convictions. WIGMORE § 926, at
470; § 982, at 550.
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will decide on the basis of the witness' record rather than on the
merits of the case."8 The North Carolina court felt that because
jurors are intelligent people they will be able to weigh such evidence
properly, 9 but not all authorities agree." If the witness is not a
party to the action, introducing prior convictions of traffic violations
having no bearing on veracity is judicially inefficient. Since most
jurors are motorists, the chances are quite good that many of them
will also have a record of traffic violations. Realizing that if they
were the witness, the same would be used to cast doubt on their
credibility, many jurors will simply ignore the evidence or else be-
come antagonized.
Since the effect on the jury may be highly negative, a second
reason for excluding proof of prior traffic convictions is the abuse
to the witness. The court in Ingle said "responsible counsel will not
abuse the rule."'" Counsel have not always been noted for such re-
straint, however.22 It should be remembered that "witnesses have
rights as well as parties; it is too often the case that they are set up
as marks to be shot at."'23 When this element of abuse is overlooked,
the witness stand becomes a nightmare of pain and embarrassment.
A witness of upstanding character in the community, coerced into
exposing a prior drunken driving charge, may find himself preju-
diced thereafter. Under these circumstances witnesses with the true
" It would seem that the same reason for not allowing evidence of general
character of the party to a civil suit should apply to evidence of prior crim-
inal convictions for impeachment purposes when the party becomes a witness
on his own behalf and consequently subject to cross-examination. See
STANSBURY § 103, at 238-39; 59 Wis. L. Rv. 312, 320-21 (1959).
"0 Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d
265, 270 (1967).
o As one author has eloquently stated:
One may consciously accept impeachment evidence for what it is
worth, but the barbs of prejudice possess an uncanny faculty for im-
pressing the unconscious self. Warning judicial instructions may
carefully distinguish the uses to which particular items of proof may
be put, yet it is highly improbable that cold, judicial analysis will
temper or control the juror's very human propensity to take all things
into account.
Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses; Common Law Principles and Modern
Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1958). See also, 59 Wis. L. REv. 312, 322
(1959).
-271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967).
"In WIGMORE § 983, at 550-51 the suggestion is made that abuse of
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facts will hesitate voluntarily to subject themselves to the ordeal.24
Consequently, the judicial process is hampered.
In many jurisdictions allowing evidence of all crimes for im-
peachment purposes, it is possible for the trial judge to exclude
evidence of some prior convictions.2" After Ingle, this safeguard
may or may not exist in North Carolina. Having stated the abso-
lute rule that all convictions are admissible to impeach a witness,
the court said, "furthermore, the judge is in charge of the trial, and
he has plenary power to protect a witness from harrassment and to
keep cross-examination within the bounds of reason. ' 26 Thus the
phantom of certainty vanishes. Attorneys and trial judges are left
to ponder what will happen on appeal if the judge exercises his dis-
cretion and excludes evidence of a prior criminal conviction. Will
the Supreme Court uphold the mandate that all convictions are ad-
missible, or will the court uphold the trial judge's exercise of
plenary power?
The need to avoid cluttering up the trial with confusing, col-
lateral issues and to prevent abuse of witnesses supports having broad
discretion in the trial judge. Since most courts place no time limit
on convictions admissible to impeach a witness," absent discretion
in the trial judge to eliminate some convictions, the jury might be
considering a conviction so remote as not even to have bearing on
general character.28  Moreover, at the trial the judge has the
advantage of demeanor evidence to guide him.2"
It is interesting to note that in the case of McMullen v. Can-
non 3 cited in Ingle to support the admissibility of traffic convictions,
the Indiana court definitively resolved in the negative the issue of dis-
" WIGMORE § 921, at 446.
" "There should be some discretion in the court to determine whether
the question is asked for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness
or whether its purpose is merely to arouse suspicion in the mind of jurors."
Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1924); see Hunter v. State,
193 Md. 596, 69 A.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1949); Commonwealth v. Quaranta,
295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 A. 89, 92 (1928).
2271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967).
Ladd 176; MCCORMIcK § 43, at 91.
'8 See Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 39, 95 A. 1073, 1077 (1915) where
the court said that to permit evidence of a conviction for drunkeness ten
years prior tended "to reflect on the intelligence of the jury to suppose they
would be influenced in passing on credibility by such evidence."
2 Being able to observe the reaction of both the witness and the jury,
the trial judge is in a better position to detect abuse than is the appellate
court with only a record of the trial." 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d 765 (1958).
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cretion in the trial judge to eliminate some evidence .3 However, until
the North Carolina court further elucidates the nature of this "plen-
ary power" and the "bounds of reason," the answer in this jurisdic-
tion is uncertain.
The argument has been made that if the legislature labels cer-
tain conduct a crime, it is indicative of the moral tenor of society,
and he who violates that law should thereafter be accountable for
impeachment purposes in a court of law. 2 It should not be for-
gotten, however, that "there may be convictions of violations of
hundreds of police regulations, which in no real sense can be taken
as tending to make one so convicted unworthy of belief."3 No one
would contend that, with traffic fatalities mounting each year, traffic
laws should be regarded lightly, but the law makes provision for
punishment of such offenders, and the witness stand is not the proper
place. Veracity and honesty should be the criteria as to the type of
criminal convictions permitted in evidence. The trial judge should
have discretion to eliminate evidence of convictions that are ir-
relevant, remote and abusive. Only when these prerequisites are met
will the jury have testimony that can be weighed with intelligence
rather than emotion.
SARAH E. PARKER
Labor Law-Decreasing Importance of Employer Motivation
as an Element of Unfair Labor Practice
Though inquiry under section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act specifically requires a finding of discrimination and a
"1 The court followed the decision in Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind.
688, 700-01, 51 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1943) where the court held that the trial
judge was not authorized to exclude entirely evidence of a prior criminal
conviction even though the extent to which cross examination may be
carried is within his sound discretion. 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d 765,
767 (1958).
.State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 116, 287 P. 909, 921 (1930).
"Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 173, 155 A. 153, 157 (1931).
2 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964): "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under section
157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964): "Employees shall have the right to self-
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